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THE ACT REQUIREMENT AS A BASIC CONCEPT OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Francisco Muiioz-Conde* 
Luis Ernesto Chiesa*' 
In The Grammar of Criminal: Law American, Comparative, 
International, Fletcher elaborated what he called a "communicative 
concept of action."' According to Fletcher, it is necessary to examine 
the context in which a movement or non-movement takes place in order 
to determine whether or not we intersubjectively consider such 
movement or non-movement to be a socially relevant action that may 
trigger the imposition of criminal liability. His aim was to develop a 
theory about how we understand actions instead of developing a theory, 
as criminal law scholars often do, about how we can biologically or 
psychologically explain them. 
In light of the fact that, for the most part, we agree with the theory 
of action that Fletcher defends in Grammar, in the first section of this 
Article we will attempt to show why the communicative concept of 
action should be preferred over competing concepts of action that have 
emerged in continental criminal law theory over the past fifty years. In 
the second and third sections, we will explain why we believe that 
Fletcher's theory is also superior to Michael Moore's mechanistic 
concept of action and to Douglas Husak's control principle, which are 
the most important theories of action developed in the last decades in 
the Anglo-American criminal law theory. 
* Professor of Criminal Law, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville, Spain. 
* Adjunct Professor of Criminal Law, Pace University School of Law. 
We are indebted to Patrick Rideout for taking the time to read the text and provide us with 
valuable criticism and suggestions. 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL AW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, 
INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 408, on file with the Cardozo Law Review) 
[hereinafter GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT]. 
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I. FROM A CAUSAL AND TELEOLOGICAL THEORY OF ACTION TO A 
COMMUNICATIVE CONCEPT OF ACTION: COMPARATIVE P RSPECTIVES 
A. The Causal and Teleological Theories 
The act requirement as a basic concept of criminal law poses two 
problems: 
1. On the one hand, if the point of reference and gravitational 
center on which criminal responsibility should be posited is 
an act understood as a willed bodily movement, it follows 
that any other factor extrinsic to the act, such as the 
dangerousness of the actor, his belonging to a particular 
ethnic or racial group, his political or religious convictions, 
etc., should be excluded as a condition for criminal liability. 
2. On the other hand, if one accepts, as is generally accepted at 
this moment in countries that share our same cultural 
background, that human action is a prerequisite of penal 
responsibility, then we should ask ourselves which is the 
concept of action that we need to use as the foundation and 
backbone of criminal liability. 
With regard to the first problem, today there seems to be 
agreement amongst courts and commentators about the fact that 
criminal responsibility and criminal law theory should be based on what 
the actor does, that is, on his actions or willed bodily movements, 
instead of on the status of the actor. It is debatable, however, whether 
one can establish a unitary concept of action that can serve as a basis for 
the theoretical and practical elaboration of the processes of attribution 
that give rise to penal liability. During the last fifty years, the 
discussion of this problem in German criminal law theory (and in the 
criminal law theory of other parts of the world such as Spain and Latin 
America, because of the influence of German criminal law) has been 
dominated by the controversy between the causal (Mezger)* and the 
teleological (Welzel)3 theories of action. Both theories are based on the 
assumption that human action is the cornerstone of criminal law theory, 
and that its chief feature is the will. The distinction is that for the causal 
theory, the concept of action does not require knowledge about what, in 
the first instance, is the content of the human will, what the actor wants, 
which is something that is examined during a later stage in the analysis 
2 EDMUND MEZGER, STRAFRECHT (3d ed. 1949). But he started to stress his theory in 
opposition to the theological theory by Welzel, see infra note 3, in EDMUND MEZGER, MODERNE 
WEGE DER STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK (1950) (Spanish translation). For more about Mezger and 
his relationship with the Nazi Criminal Law, see FRANCISCO M~oz-CONDE,  EDMUND MEZGER 
Y EL DERECHO PENAL DE SU TIEMPO (4th ed. 2004). 
3 HANS WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT (1 lth ed. 1970) (Spanish translation). 
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of criminal responsibility (mainly, in the analysis of culpability or 
guilt). However, for the teleological theory, the content of the action, 
understood as the aim that the actor wants to achieve with his act, is also 
an element of the very concept of action which, therefore, should be the 
object of evaluation from the moment that we define what an act is. 
The two theories allow for many fine distinctions and 
interpretations, but, in the end, despite their apparent differences, both 
coincide in that they maintain a purely individual concept of action 
based on bio-psychological and naturalistic considerations, causal and 
teleological, that make the center of gravity fall upon the perspective of 
the subject who acts, disregarding the effect of the action or the 
perception that other people have concerning the act. Only a theory 
espoused by a small number of commentators in Germany, called the 
social theory of action (Jescheck)? stresses the social relevance of the 
act as a key component of the concept of action. This excessively 
generic approach adds little to the other two concepts of action 
previously mentioned. However, it has the virtue of underscoring the 
importance that the social dimension of the act has for the concept of 
action. In this sense, we believe that the communicative concept of 
action maintained by George Fletcher in his Grammar of Criminal Law 
signifies an important step in the aforementioned direction. It still 
considers the concept of action as an essential element of criminal law 
theory, but analyzes it from a much more current point of view that is in 
accordance with the actual conceptions that modem philosophy of 
language supplies regarding the theory of action. 
B. Fletcher's Communicative Theory of Action 
In order to formulate a concept of action that can serve as the 
foundation of a theory of national and international criminal law, 
Fletcher highlights a point, in our opinion a fundamental one, which in 
general, has not been sufficiently accentuated by the defenders of other 
theories. This may be because they take it for granted, or because they 
do not believe it to be a fundamental element of the concept. This point 
is the idea that a concept that has to be assessed in the future by third 
parties cannot be analyzed like a metaphysical abstraction separated 
from its context and the social reality in which the subject acts. 
For Fletcher, the first thing that needs to be noticed in the concept 
of action is that human conduct is always a form of expression or of 
'relevant communication between human beings. Consequently, if we 
DR. HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL (2d 
ed. 1982) (Spanish translation); Dr. HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, 
LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS (5th ed. 2000) (Spanish translation). 
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consider the concept of action from the point of view of the traditional 
theories (causal or  teleological), we ignore precisely the only thing that 
really characterizes human action in general, and human criminal action 
in particular: that, regardless of any external assessment that can be 
made of it, human action is, above all, a form of intersubjective 
communication and not a simple causal or teleological process. To 
buttress his theory, Fletcher offers various examples: 
1. If a professor is teaching a class or delivering a lecture in a 
classroom, and none of the students or participants gets up 
and slaps him, that does not mean that someone is omitting 
slapping him; however, if after the lecture, the attendants 
remain seated without leaving the classroom, it is plausible 
to interpret this as a form of protest or as something with 
some socially relevant meaning. It is not necessary at this 
point to examine the reasons regarding why the omission of 
the action (getting up from the seat in the classroom) has 
different significance in each case. The only thing that 
should be highlighted here is that, from our perspective, the 
same omissive process can, and in effect does, have 
different  meaning^.^ 
2. Another example: Everybody knows that the guard at 
London's Buckingham Palace has the peculiarity of 
remaining motionless when he is on guard while children 
pose at his side and tourists take pictures of him. However, 
everyone knows that the guard is also performing an action, 
namely, safekeeping the door to the palace, and that if 
somebody tries to break in, it is likely that the guard will 
proceed to detain him or to do something in order to stop 
him. Does this mean that that he only acts at that moment, 
or is he already acting, even if it does not look like it, when 
he remains motionless in the guardhouse? If he is acting, 
what makes his purely omissive conduct an action? Is it his 
purpose, or a particular causal process, or the interpretation 
and meaning that everyone attributes to the simple fact of 
standing moti~nless?~ 
3. Finally, Fletcher posits another example of similar 
characteristics: When the psychoanalyst listens, without 
making a gesture, to what his patient has to say during a 
session, how should one interpret his merely passive 
attitude? As a causal process, as the exercise of a purposeful 
activity, or as meaningful conduct for the patient or for any 
impartial observer contemplating the scene?' 
5 GRAMMAR ~ ~ A N U S C R I P T ,  supra note 1, at 410. 
6 Id. at410-11. 
7 Id. at 410. 
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With these examples, Fletcher wants to stress that acts, whether 
they are actions in the strict sense of the term, or omissions, should not 
be understood as a pure ontological causal or teleological process, but 
as a form of communication, as meaninghl conduct that makes sense 
both to the person who acts and to the rest of us. 
In our opinion, from Fletcher's communicative theory of action 
one can derive another fundamental fact that needs to be taken into 
account when formulating a concept of action. This fact is that the 
concept of action cannot be decomposed, like the causal or teleological 
theories seem to suggest, into a discrete event, or into a sequence of 
isolated discrete events. Let us illustrate this by way of our own 
examples. 
1. .The person who, with the intention to kill, loses control of 
his actions while stabbing the victim and blindly and 
impulsively inflicts more stabs than necessary to kill, acts 
and kills. His act of killing should be assessed, therefore, as 
a whole, without having to decompose his action into the 
many stabs that he inflicted. Similarly, it is irrelevant, in 
principle, whether a particular murder was produced by one 
or various gunshots, as long as they are fired in a continuous 
manner and with a unitary intent to kill. 
2. The person who goes for a walk or a stroll performs various 
bodily movements, such as, moving his legs, taking one 
step, and then another. However, the act of walking or 
going for a stroll is a unitary action that includes all of the 
discrete steps needed in order to perform it, and should not 
be conceived as a combination of various discrete and 
separate acts. 
3. The person who drives a motor vehicle necessarily performs 
various separate acts like stepping on the brakes, 
accelerating, changing gears, and moving the steering wheel. 
These acts, taken as a whole, make up the single action of 
driving and each of them would lack relevance outside of 
this context. 
Ultimately, what these examples highlight is that, in these cases, 
the global significance of killing, walking, or driving a vehicle, and not 
the number of stabs, gunshots, steps or driving maneuvers performed by 
the actor, is what is of interest regarding the concept of action. 
Contrarily, if we only emphasize the partial aspects or the different 
temporal sequences of a unitary action that give meaning to these 
fractional moments, the act will stop making sense and we will give 
importance and meaning to that which in isolation does not make any 
sense or has significance only in a different way. 
This can be clearly grasped when one examines the different 
defenses that negate the existence of human action. Consider 
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determining the responsibility of a driver in a car accident. Certainly, 
somebody that loses control of his car because he used his hand to swat 
at a bee that had just entered the window of his vehicle acts in an 
instinctive, involuntary manner, if one only examines the isolated act of 
swatting at the bee. This is not so, however, if one analyzes the event 
from the perspective of the unitary action of driving. This is the only 
way that we can know if the actor could have stopped the car, reduced 
the speed of the vehicle, etc. These, in turn, will be the relevant factors 
in order to assess whether he acted correctly from the point of view of 
what is considered permissible in the context of the rules that regulate 
motor traffic. The reason for this is that the act of driving a motor 
vehicle is not solely composed of various interconnected actions. The 
interrelationship between the different actions is the product of a 
previous learning experience that, once learned, becomes habitual. 
Obviously, the acts of stepping on the breaks, accelerating, or changing 
gears are decisive when we assess the action of driving a vehicle, not 
because of their isolated voluntariness or involuntariness, but because 
they are elements of the very action of driving, which is the only one 
that, taken as a whole, has communicative relevance and meaning. This 
is why the passive or active nature of the discrete and isolated conduct 
examined is often irrelevant; not stepping on the breaks or gratuitously 
accelerating the automobile are things that ultimately pertain to the 
broader concept of action implicit in driving the vehicle. 
A different problem regarding the concept of action has to do with 
the perspective from which we should analyze the meaning of the act. 
Fletcher's theory on this matter dovetails with the one espoused by the 
Spanish criminal law scholar, Tomas Vives Anton.8 Vives Anton 
defends an "expressive" concept of action in which an "action is the 
assessment of an underlying fact and not the fact underlying an 
asse~sment."~ The question that now emerges is the following: Is it 
necessary to appeal to considerations that lie outside the very concept of 
action in order to give meaning to an act? If so, this would make the 
concept of action lose its fundamental nature and would introduce to the 
analysis elements that are typically not associated with the act 
requirement, namely: purely normative elements that vary according to 
the context in which the action takes place. If the act that we make 
reference to is, for example, the concrete "action of killing," the 
possibility of an abstract concept of action is lost. Consequently, it 
8 TOMAS VlVES A N T ~ N ,  FUNDAMENTOS DEL SISTEMA PENAL 203-79 (1996). Spanish 
criminal law theory follows this conception as well. See, e.g., Carlos Martinez Bujin Perez, La 
Concepcidn Significativa de la Accidn de T.S: Vives, in HOMENAJE A BARBERO, CUENCIA 
(2001); PAULO CESAR BUSATO, DERECHO PENAL Y A C C I ~ N  SIGNIFICATIVA (2007); FRANCISCO 
MUROZ-CONDE & MERCEDES GARC~A ARAN, DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL 2 15-220 (6th 
ed. 2004). 
9 A N T ~ N ,  supra note 8, at 205 (translated by authors). 
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would not be plausible to talk about the general requirements that 
should underlie every criminal or non-criminal action, be it the action of 
stealing, of committing a homicide, or of forging a document. In any 
case, even if we recognize that the concept of action that is of interest to 
the criminal law is that of a "homicidal action," or an action constitutive 
of theft, robbery, or rape, it is clear that this is the product of a choice 
that the legislator makes in which he selects certain events as legally 
relevant. However, this choice presupposes that the legislator had 
previously determined what qualities or attributes the selected event 
should have in order to later supply considerations specifically relevant 
to the criminal law (definition of the offense, absence of justification, 
and absence of excuse). 
In deciding which considerations give meaning to the act, it is 
necessary to study the considerations that underpin the other categories 
of the theory of criminal responsibility (definition of the offense, 
wrongdoing, and culpability). As a precautionary measure, we should 
clarify that even though many of the problems that are analyzed within 
the categories of wrongdoing and culpability are already present in the 
analysis of the very concept of action, the basic elements of the act 
requirement can be established without examining these considerations. 
Therefore, there can be an action even when elements that are essential 
to the establishment of the other categories of criminal responsibility are 
absent. The following distinction illustrates this point: capacity for 
action versus capacity for culpability. 
Even though sometimes these two concepts are not easily 
differentiated, one can theoretically distinguish between them. This 
distinction has important practical implications. The capacity for action 
has to do with the purely experiential ability to choose between various 
possible courses of action at a given moment. On the other hand, the 
capacity for culpability is the ability to choose between good and evil 
and to act in accordance with the choice made. An action is not 
culpable in and of itself. However, it is a necessary prerequisite for 
culpability. Therefore, we should not include within the concept of 
action that which is to be assessed specifically during the determination 
of culpability. 
C .  Importance of Social Context 
Finally, a few things should be said regarding the importance of 
interpreting an action within the particular social context in which it is 
performed. 
From the positions maintained by Fletcher and Vives Anton it can 
be deduced that no socially relevant action exists in and of itself. Acts 
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acquire their relevance and significance depending on how they are 
perceived and assessed by persons other than the one who performed 
the conduct. This leads us to establish as significant criteria in the 
theory of action certain societal considerations that should be taken into 
account before one assesses the legal considerations inherent in the 
different categories of criminal responsibility. Therefore, we should 
take into account the social importance of the action performed, the 
reasonability of the course of action selected, and the reasons for 
engaging in the action. Naturally, these criteria can lead us to 
demarcate a concept of action that is relevant for the criminal law. 
However, what is of importance here is to establish that we already use 
these criteria in our daily life in order to determine the social relevance 
of an action. Typically, almost every act that remains within what is 
socially important, or reasonable, or normal according to current 
societal standards, negates the legal relevance of the conduct in light of 
extra-legal considerations. These extra-legal considerations are later 
transformed into legal considerations when one employs them to 
determine the content of the different categories of criminal 
responsibility. Let us illustrate this with some examples: 
1. First of all, we can ascertain whether an agent acted 
intentionally or with a mental element (intent to deprive 
someone of his property, with knowledge of the criminality 
of his conduct, etc.) by examining indicators that are 
socially deemed to be revealing of those states of mind. For 
example, the use of a firearm or a big knife for the infliction 
of physical harm is generally considered sufficient to 
establish that the actor's purpose was to kill and not merely 
to batter. A financially troubled banker's misrepresentation 
of the money owed by a corporation to his company is 
probably the product of a fraudulent scheme and not of an 
accounting mistake. The decision of a judge to wantonly 
disregard his professional obligations is probably done with 
knowledge of the fact that what he does is illegal and not out 
of the fact that he did not know the extent of his legal 
obligations. A tragic example taken out of the recent history 
of this city can better illustrate what we have just said: After 
September 1 1, 2001, what previously could have been 
understood as the hijacking of an airplane in which the 
hijackers would liberate the hostages if they were given 
something in exchange (this was very common in the 70's 
and go's), today would probably be interpreted as the initial 
stage of an imminent terrorist attack. This, in turn, would 
trigger a different response than the one that we would 
expect in the 70's or 80's (for example, shooting down the 
plane before it is used as a missile against a target, which 
presents a distinct legal problem). 
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2. Whether we would recognize as reasonable a belief that 
someone is acting in self-defense when the alleged aggressor 
put his hand in his pockets and at the same time said "I am 
going to kill you" depends on the context and the knowledge 
that the threatened person has regarding the reputation and 
personality of the alleged aggressor (maybe the threatened 
person knows that the aggressor is a killer for hire that 
always has a gun in his pocket, or maybe he knows that the 
supposed aggressor is mentally ill and that he threatens 
people with killing them all the time without meaning any 
real harm). 
3. Pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun may be an irrelevant 
act or a joke, but pulling the trigger believing the gun to be 
loaded acquires social significance and, consequently, legal 
significance as well. By the same token, it also has social 
and legal significance for a person to encourage someone to 
get on a plane when that person has put a bomb inside the 
aircraft so that it will explode. However, no legal or social 
significance would attach if this person was solely 
encouraging another onto the plane so that he arrives sooner 
at a given destination, and then during the flight the aircraft 
crashes. 
All of these examples highlight that the concept of action only 
acquires meaning in relation with a concrete society and as part of a 
particular social system or subsystem. Of course, this model is never 
value-neutral. In consequence, it is necessary to continuously interpret 
the model and to keep in mind its relationship with a concrete mode of 
discourse, that is, with the particular way in which people settle 
agreements in order to regulate coexistence in society and the conflicts 
that arise within the social order.'O 
From what has been said one can conclude that the concept of 
action should include all of the processes that have meaning in a 
concrete social context. From there one can take into account many 
successive considerations that could determine the existence of criminal 
responsibility. This is, in our opinion, the most important contribution 
that Fletcher makes to the theory of action as a basic prerequisite of the 
grammar of national and international criminal law. George Fletcher is 
conscious that a theory of action relevant for the criminal law should be 
elaborated from an "expressive" or "communicative" perspective. In 
other words, an action should be perceived as an event that is a part of 
reality, which only has meaning within said reality, and that helps to 
explain and understand that reality by taking into account the context 
'0 About the theory of imputation in Criminal Law as a "Discourse," see WINF~UED 
HASSEMER, PERSONA, MUNDO Y RESPONSABILIDAD 160 (Maria del Mar Diaz Pita & Francisco 
Muiioz-Conde trans., 1999). 
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surrounding the event. Thus, the theory of action should not be 
centered on a priori ontological abstractions that have nothing to do 
with the eminently social nature of human beings. 
11. MICHAEL MOORE'S MECHANISTIC CONCEPT OF ACTION AND THE 
PROBLEM OF PUNISHING OMISSIONS 
A. Objections to Michael Moore's Mechanistic Theory 
Several years ago, Michael Moore espoused a mechanistic theory 
of action that is squarely at odds with George Fletcher's communicative 
concept of action. Because of this opposition, and in light of the fact 
that Moore's theory has garnered much support amongst Anglo- 
American criminal law theorists,ll we believe that it is necessary for us 
to discuss some objections that can be leveled against Moore's concept 
of action. 
In Act and Crime, Moore suggested that all the act requirement 
means is that "before one can be punished for any crime whatsoever, 
one must have performed some simple bodily movement caused by 
one's volition[.]"l2 As a consequence of Moore's theory of actions as 
"willed bodily movements," punishing omissions violates the act 
requirement.'3 However, exceptionally punishing certain omissions, 
even if doing so runs afoul of the act requirement, is legitimate when 
the injustice of not punishing them overshadows the reduction of liberty 
that criminalizing omissions entails.14 
From a normative point of view, Moore believes that his concept 
of actions as "movements of the body caused by volitions" and of 
omissions as cbnon-movements'~ captures the important fact that our 
obligations to omit the performance of a bad act have more moral force 
than our obligations to perform good acts.l5 Hence, the mechanistic 
distinction between acts and omissions mirrors the moral distinction 
between positive and negative duties. In much the same manner as it is 
and should be true that we have a stronger negative duty to avoid 
engaging in wrongful actions than we have a positive duty to engage in 
righteous actions, it is and should be true that criminal responsibility 
1 1  See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 112 
(1996) (stating that the criminal law is generally concerned with "willed bodily movements that 
cause harm to others"); see also Heidi M .  Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 157, 184 (1994) (equating actions with "willed bodily movements"). 
12 MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 46 (Tony Honor6 & Joseph Raz eds., 1993). 
13 Id. at 54. 
14 Id. at 59. 
15 Id. at 58. 
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should, as a general rule, be triggered by actions and, only in rare cases, 
by omissions. 
In our opinion, the parallelism that Moore wants to highlight 
between acts and omissions on the one hand and negative and positive 
duties on the other hand is illusory. What is needed in order to 
adequately explain why obligations to abstain from performing 
wrongful acts usually carry more moral freight than obligations to 
realize good acts is a robust theory of duties and not, as Moore suggests, 
a theory of action. Consequently, Moore's normative defense of the 
mechanistic concept of action fails to satisfactorily account for the 
following three deeply held intuitions: (1) that some results that are the 
product of omissions are as wrongful as similar results that are the 
product of actions; (2) that the reason why we believe that some failures 
to act that cause a result should be punished as harshly as actions 
provoking the same result has more to do with communitarian ideals of 
solidarity than with libertarian notions of liberty; and (3) that classifying 
certain types of conduct as either acts or omissions does more to 
obscure the normative considerations surrounding the event than to 
illuminate them. Let us discuss each of these intuitions and the inability 
of a mechanistic theory of action to account for them separately. 
B. Equally Culpable Acts and Omissions 
According to Moore, "[w]rongful as it is to let [someone die], it is 
much more wrongful to [kill them]."I6 This is premised on the 
assumption that making the world a worse place is morally more 
reprehensible than failing to improve the world.17 Hence, the person 
who acts and kills is more blameworthy than the person who omits and 
lets die because the omitter who lets someone die fails to make the 
world better, whereas the actor who kills makes the world a worse 
place. This is not always true. The mother who contributes to her 
newborn child's death by intentionally refusing to feed her is as 
deserving of blame as the mother who contributes to her baby's death 
by feeding her food that makes her sick. In this particular instance, 
whether the result was caused by an act (feeding the baby food that 
made her sick) or an omission (failing to feed the baby) strikes us as 
totally irrelevant to the question of whether or not the mother should be 
held responsible for the death of her child.'8 
'6 Id. 
17 Id. at 58-59. 
18 Whether the death was brought about by an act or an omission also strikes us as irrelevant 
to determining the amount of punishment that she deserves. 
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The following example can also be afforded in favor of the 
proposition that certain omissions are as wrongful as certain actions. 
The sole emergency room doctor who contributes to his patient's death 
by intentionally refusing to perform a surgery that would save his life 
acts more culpably than a doctor who contributes to the patient's death 
by recklessly performing the surgery. Intentionally omitting to perform 
a surgery that the doctor had a duty to perform and that would save the 
patient's life is more culpable (or, at the very least, as culpable) than 
negligently performing the operation. In this example, the morally 
decisive criterion seems to be the mental state of the doctor and not 
whether he produced the result by way of an act or an omission. 
What these cases illustrate is that what really makes a difference in 
our evaluation of the blameworthiness of actors who contribute to the 
production of a result by omitting to perform an action is whether or not 
they had a duty to perform the omitted action. When it is deemed that 
the actor did in fact have an obligation to realize the omitted action, we 
will, in many cases, conclude that bringing about the result by an 
omission is as culpable as positively causing the result by way of an 
action. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Moore seems to believe that the 
"straightforward and intuitive" response in the case of the mother who 
fails to feed her child would be to conclude that the parent who 
produces the death of his child by abstaining from feeding him is clearly 
less deserving of punishment than the parent who provokes the death of 
his baby by making him eat food that makes him sick. The problem is 
that, besides this bare assertion, Moore does not provide much more 
support for his thesis. His response is much less "intuitive" than what 
he believes it to be. As far as we know, all legal systems, civil and 
common law, punish killings produced by certain omissions in the same 
manner that they punish killings caused by actions.19 Furthermore, as 
Moore himself acknowledged, there is support in the philosophical 
literature for the proposition that some omissions can be as wrongful as 
actions.20 Criminal law theorists on both sides of the Atlantic share this 
view as we11.21 In light of the overwhelming support in favor of this 
proposition, it seems fair to place the burden of proof on those who, like 
Moore, believe that there is something suspect in thinking that results 
19 See, e.g., P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33 8 3092 (1996); Australia Criminal Code Act, 1995 8 
4.3(b); FINISH PENAL CODE chap. 3, 8 3(2); SPANISH PENAL CODE art. I1 (1995); MODEL PENAL 
CODE 8 2.01(3)(b) (1962). 
20 See, e.g,, James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 
(1975). Moore admits in Act and Crime that there is support in favor of the contention that some 
omissions should be regarded as wrongful as similar actions. MOORE, supra note 12, at 58. 
* I  In Anglo-America see, for example, ROLLIN . PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL 
LAW 659-62 (3d ed. 1983). In Germany see, for example, GONTHER JAKOBS, STRAFRECHT, 
ALLCEMEINER TEIL 645-709 (1 983). 
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provoked by failures to act can be as blameworthy as those caused by 
positive actions. 
C. The Libertarian Concerns for Criminalizing Omissions 
In our opinion, the reason why Moore is led to support the 
infelicitous conclusion-that results caused by acts are always more 
wrongful than those caused by omissions-lies in the political theory 
underpinning his mechanistic concept of action. For Moore, punishing 
omissions is problematic because doing so diminishes our liberty to act 
much more than criminalizing actions. Imposing a duty to perform an 
act, such as saving someone's life, restricts a person's liberty to engage 
in myriad activities that can be carried out at that time and place, such 
as swimming, sleeping, working or going to the movies. However, 
imposing a duty not to engage in a particular act, such as killing, leaves 
the person with considerable freedom to engage in whatever act he 
wishes to perform with the exception of the prohibited action. 
If one looks at these cases from a radically libertarian point of 
view, as Moore does, justifying the substantial diminution of liberty that 
follows from punishing failures to act is extremely difficult and, almost 
always, impossible. This leads him to conclude that, as a general rule, 
criminalizing omissions is illegitimate. Exceptions to this rule should 
only be made when "the injustice of not punishing [such omissions] 
outweighs the diminution of liberty such punishment entails."22 
It seems to us that Moore is barking up the wrong philosophical 
tree. Trying to justify the criminalization of omissions from a 
libertarian perspective is a daunting task. Attempting to do so will 
almost inevitably lead to skepticism with regards to the legitimacy of 
punishing failures to act. Upon closer inspection, however, one can see 
that the problem of justifying the imposition of criminal liability for 
omissions has a lot to do with communitarian notions of solidarity and 
very little to do with libertarian concerns about the diminution of 
freedom. 
The reason why we find unproblematic the punishment of certain 
omissions, such as the intentional refusal to feed one's child, is because 
we believe that the duties of persons cannot be determined without 
taking into account the fact that they belong to particular institutions 
whose very existence depends on the acceptance of reciprocal 
obligations of aiding the rest of the members of the c0mrnunity.~3 This 
is most obviously true in the case of the family. We have no problem 
22 MOORE, supra note 12, at 59. 
23 See generally DANIEL VARONA G ~ M E Z ,  DERECHO PENAL Y SOLIDARIDAD 109 (2005). 
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with recognizing that a parent has a duty to keep his baby free from 
harm and that spouses have the obligation to look out for each other 
because we understand that bonds of solidarity unite the members of a 
family. Consequently, there is nothing "hard-to-justify," as Moore 
suggests,24 in the widely held belief that we owe more duty to those that 
are near and dear to us than to strangers. 
Recourse to the communitarian notion of solidarity also helps to 
explain why it is not inherently suspect to impose on the populace a 
general duty to rescue those in harms way. Because of the fact that we 
are "social beings" and "members of a political community," we depend 
on a very real sense on our fellow citizens.25 Hence, subject to certain 
limitati0ns,~6 punishing failures to aid helps reaffirm the vital link that 
unites both omitter and victim as members of a c0mmunity.2~ 
D. Actor's Intent, Not Act or Omission, Relevant 
Another problem with Moore's mechanistic theory of action is 
that, on some occasions, classifying conduct as either a "willed bodily 
movement" or an instance of non-movement does little to clarify the 
normative issues at stake. This is particularly true in the euthanasia 
cases. Whether the nurse who contributed to her patients death by 
terminating life support moved her finger in order to turn off the 
machine that supplied fluids to the catheter or refused to replenish the 
catheter once it became empty is irrelevant to determining if she should 
be held criminally responsible for killing the patient. The only pertinent 
consideration in this case is if the patient consented to having life 
support terminated and not whether the nurse decided to terminate it by 
moving the muscles of her finger or by refusing to move them. 
The argument against placing too much weight on the 
movement/non-movement distinction in the context of the euthanasia 
debate was forcefully advanced by a leading lawyer and bioethicist in 
the following manner: 
The moral distinction between killing and letting die-between 
actively and passively causing death-has been examined by many 
bioethicists, philosophers, and lawyers. Most have concluded that 
the distinction between active and passive, on which opponents so 
heavily rest, is a distinction without a significant enough moral 
difference to support the great weight that opponents of physician- 
24 MOORE, supra note 12, at 57. 
25 Id. 
26 The most common restriction is to limit the duty to aid to cases in which the rescue can be 
done without peril or danger to the rescuer. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, $ 5 19 (2005). 
27 VARONA G ~ M E Z ,  supra note 23, at 115. 
Heinonline - -  28 Cardozo L .  Rev. 2474 2006-2007 
T H E  A C T  R E Q U I R E M E N T  
assisted suicide have placed on it. From the perspective of the 
affected individual, the sought for end-the relief of suffering and 
demise-is the same regardless of whether the immediate cause of 
death is described as active or passive, killing or letting die. 
[Furthermore], [tlhe line drawn. . . between active and passive is 
also vulnerable to a charge of inconsistency or arbitrariness. It is 
difficult to know in practice why one thing is labeled active . . . and 
therefore not permitted, and another is labeled passive and 
permitted. . . . Withdrawing treatment is said to be passive, yet many 
acts of withdrawal are quite active, for example, "pulling the plug" is 
literally an act. One cannot easily distinguish [these cases] in all 
significant respects. . . .28 
Overstating the significance of the act/omission distinction 
generates a misunderstanding of a very important fact in the context of 
the euthanasia debate: a doctor violates his patient's rights whenever he 
intends to cause the death of his patient against his wishes. Hence, if 
the nurse in the aforementioned example were to withdraw life support 
without the patient's consent, she should be held criminally responsible 
for causing the death of the patient. It would be wrong to believe that 
she would deserve less punishment if she chose to provoke her patient's 
death by refusing to refill the catheter instead of by turning off the 
machine connected to the feeding tubes. In both cases she is equally 
blameworthy because what really matters is that she intended to cause 
the death of her patient against his will and not whether she provoked 
his death by moving her finger (act) or by abstaining from doing so 
(omission). 
E. Support for Fletcher's Social Approach 
From a scientific or ontological point of view, there is nothing 
wrong with Moore's definition of actions as bodily movements caused 
by the will and omissions as the absence of bodily movements. 
However, the normative appeal of his theory of action, as we have 
attempted to demonstrate, is limited. The movementJnon-movement 
distinction does more to obscure the moral principles at stake than to 
illuminate them. Consequently, we agree with Fletcher's contention 
that we need to situate the conduct of the actor within the particular 
context in which it took place in order to understand its social and legal 
significance. As a result of this, we should abandon the mechanistic 
conception of actions as bodily movements and substitute it for a more 
28 John A. Robertson, Respect for Life in Bioethical Dilemmas-The Case of Physician 
Assisted Suicide, 45 CLEV. ST .  L. REV. 329, 333-34 (1997) (citations omitted). 
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humanistic theory of actions premised on the fact that conduct acquires 
significance by virtue of being intersubjectively perceived as an 
instance of meaningful and relevant behavior and not by virtue of being 
the product of a muscular contraction caused by the volitions of the 
actor. 
111. THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHING POSSESSION AND DOUGLAS HUSAK'S 
CONTROL PRINCIPLE 
A. The "Possessioiz Problem" 
Twenty years ago, Douglas Husak decried the Anglo-American 
obsession with the "act-requirement." His position was based on the 
fact that "it is not clear that the presence or absence [of an action] is a 
crucial variable in drawing the distinction between just and unjust 
instances of penal liability.'y29 This skepticism regarding the desirability 
of maintaining an "act-requirement" as a prerequisite for criminal 
responsibility led him to recommend that we replace it with an 
alternative requirement that he dubbed the "control principle."30 
In his contribution to this issue in celebration of the appearance of 
Fletcher's Grammar, Husak made it clear that he still believes that we 
"should suspend judgment about the act requirement, and probably 
reject it altogether."3' The chief reason that he provided in favor of this 
assertion is that, contrary to what Fletcher suggests, punishment is often 
justifiably imposed for something other than actions. A paradigmatic 
example of an instance where criminal liability is imposed without-the 
existence of an act is that of possession since, according to HusaE,' 
possession offenses criminalize states of affair, not acts or omissions. 
From a descriptive point of view, Husak's characterization of 
possession crimes is, in our opinion, misguided. As he seems to 
concede in his paper, one can conceivably interpret possession offenses 
as either criminalizing an act or an omission. This, in fact, is all that the 
drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) meant when they defined 
possession as the "procure[ment]" or "rece[ption]" of the thing whose 
possession is prohibited or as the refusal to terminate its po~session.3~ 
Thus, in the official comments to 5 2.01(4) of the MPC it is stated that: 
[Tlhe concept [of possession] is an application o f  the principle that 
conduct that includes a voluntary act or an omission where there is 
physical capacity to act will suffice. An actor who knowingly 
29 DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CNMINAL AW 97 (1987). 
30 Id. at 97-99. 
3' Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437,2438 (2007). 
32 MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.01(4) (1962). 
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procures or receives the thing possessed has, of course, engaged in a 
voluntary act that can serve as the predicate for criminal liability. An 
actor who is aware of his control of the thing possessed for a period 
that would enable him to terminate control has failed to act in the 
face of a legal duty imposed by the law that makes his possession 
criminal. In both of the instances in which possession can be made 
criminal, therefore, the principle underlying Subsection (1) [that 
liability needs to be based on conduct that includes either a voluntary 
act or omission to perform an act] is satisfied.33 
This way of thinking of possession is by no means new. More than 
forty years ago, Professor Glanville Williams had already noted that, 
properly understood, possession crimes do not pose a problem for 
criminal liability because what is really being punished is either the act 
of acquiring the object or the failure to get rid of it.34 Recently, 
Professor Joshua Dressler advanced a similar conception of possession 
offenses: 
Possession crimes do not necessarily dispense with the voluntary act 
requirement. Courts interpret possession statutes to require proof 
that the defendant knowingly procured or received the property 
possessed (thus, a voluntary act must be proven), or that she failed to 
dispossess herself of the object after she became aware of its 
presence. In the later case, "possession" is equivalent to an 
omission, in which the defendant has a statutory duty to dispossess 
herself of the property.35 
Even though he anticipates that possession could be construed in a 
way such as to require the occurrence of either an act or an omission, 
Husak objects to this description of possession offenses in light of the 
fact that what we are truly punishing in these cases is the possession 
itself, not the act of receiving the goods or the omission of refusing to 
dispose of them.36 Hence, stating that what we prohibit by possession 
statutes is an act or an omission is just a clever way of avoiding the 
inevitable conclusion that by criminalizing these offenses we are 
actually not punishing an act but a state of affairs. 
The problem with this argument is that the mere possession of a 
potentially dangerous object is not noxious per se. What we really want 
to prohibit is the use of the object in a harmful way and not its 
possession as Husak suggests. As a general rule, when one possesses an 
object it is either because one used it in the past or because one plans to 
use it in the future. Hence, possession offenses represent an effective 
way of curtaiiing the prospective use of the dangerous artifact or of 
punishing its prior use. When conceived as a method of punishing the 
33 Id. 5 2.01(4) cmt. 4. 
34 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 8 (2d ed. 1961). 
35 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 104 (3d ed. 2005). 
36 Husak, supra note 3 1 ,  at 2439. 
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potential future use of the object, possession crimes appear as a type of 
inchoate offense. On the other hand, when envisaged as a means of 
punishing previous harmful uses of the artifact, possession offenses 
serve the purpose of facilitating the prosecution's case by relieving 
them of proving the actual instances in which the object was used in the 
past. This view is consistent with the one espoused by Professor Paul 
Robinson when he states that: 
[Tlhe definition of the offence [of possession] does not truly 
represent the paradigm-it does not hlly and accurately describe the 
harm or evil the offence seeks to punish. Possession offences seek to 
prohibit and punish not possession itself, but harmful conduct. . . . 
The possession of trace amounts of narcotics, for example, suggests 
their past use or distribution. The possession of burglar's tools 
suggest [sic] a planned (or past) burg la^-y.37 
In light of the abovementioned considerations, we can conclude 
that, contrary to what Husak seems to believe, there is nothing wrong 
with asserting that possession offenses prohibit either the act of 
receiving the goods or the omission of failing to terminate possession 
when faced with a duty to do so. If, as we believe it is, the purpose of 
these crimes is to prevent future injurious use of the object or to 
penalize its prior use, it makes sense to affirm that the real prohibition is 
not the possession itself but rather the voluntary act of acquiring the 
artifact or the omission of not getting rid of it. As the example of a 
person who had contraband "planted on him demonstrates, mere 
possession does not necessarily entail dangerous prospective or past use 
of the substance if the person did not have sufficient time to end the 
possession. Here, as in many cases, the gist of the crime is failing to 
terminate control over the object even though the defendant had a 
statutory duty to do so. Consequently, despite Husak's efforts to 
convince us of the contrary, punishing possession does not violate the 
act requirement. 
B. Weakness in the Control Principle 
Besides criticizing criminal theorists who, like Fletcher, defend the 
act requirement, Husak also advanced arguments in favor of substituting 
said requirement with his control principle.38 The essence of the control 
principle is that "criminal liability is unjust if imposed for a state of 
37 PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 63 (1997). Professor 
Michael Moore also agrees with the proposition that the true purpose motivating the 
crirninalization of possession crimes is not to prohibit the possession itself. MOORE, supra note 
12, at 21-22. 
38 Husak, supra note 3 1, at 2453. 
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affairs over which a person lacks control."39 The upshot of control is 
that it provides an alternative scheme in which to base criminal liability 
that does not have to deal with the complicated problem of defining and 
distinguishing actions, omissions, and possessions. Thus, the elegance 
of the proposal lies in its simplicity. If the actor had control over the 
state of affairs, then aprima facie case can be argued in favor of holding 
him responsible for said state of affairs. 
The problem with the control principle is that it proves too much. 
Myriad examples could be given of actors who should not be held 
criminally responsible despite the fact that they had control over a given 
event. Suppose, for example, that a hurricane threatens to approach 
your area. Your next-door neighbor is out of town and will not be able 
to make it back home until after the hurricane passes because all flights 
in and out of the area have been cancelled. Therefore, he calls you in 
order to ask you to board up his house so that the storm does not 
damage it. Upon his return, he would pay you a considerable amount of 
money as a token of appreciation for your help. Even though you had 
the time and resources to help your neighbor, you decide not to in order 
to go to the movies. As forecasted, the hurricane ravaged the area and, 
consequently, your neighbor's house was destroyed. Should you be 
held criminally responsible for the damages caused to the house? In our 
opinion, the answer is clearly "no" because you were not under a 
statutory duty to board your neighbor's house. However, under Husak's 
control principle, there is no reason not to hold you liable. In view of 
the fact that you had the time and resources to board up your neighbor's 
house, it should be concluded that you had "control" over whether or 
not it was going to be damaged by the storm. Hence, there would seem 
to be no impediment to hold you liable for the commission of the 
offense of criminal mischief. This is surely wrong. The right answer 
seems to be that your conduct constituted a non-punishable omission 
because no law existed that required you to engage in the action of 
helping your neighbor. 
Ultimately, the implications of the control principle are either false 
or trivially and uncontroversially true. The consequences of the 
principle are false inasmuch as they, as we just explained, prove too 
much. They are true, however, if we take the control requirement to 
mean that no liability can be imposed if the defendant did not have the 
physical capacity to control the state of affairs. Imagine, for example, 
that rioting prisoners handcuffed all correctional officers to steel beams 
located throughout a prison. If the prisoners successfully escaped from 
prison, the correctional officers should not be held liable for violating 
their duty to prevent the escape. Even though they failed to prevent the 
39 HUSAK, supra note 29, at 98. 
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escape despite having a duty to do so, they will not be held liable 
because they were handcuffed to the beams, thus lacking physical 
control over the situation. Hence, control can and does play an 
important role in these instances. This, however, is a rather trivial 
point. No one actually denies that actors who lack the physical ability 
to prevent the result from ensuing should be held criminally responsible. 
The fact that someone cannot be held liable for an act that he could not 
stop is uncontroversial. The problem is that control is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for liability. As the case of the out of town 
neighbor demonstrates, actors escape punishment in many instances 
where they had control over the situation. Therefore, the control 
principle cannot meaningfully limit the number of conducts that may 
trigger the imposition of punishment. As a result of this, in our opinion, 
Husak's control principle is not normatively more appealing than the act 
requirement that Fletcher defends in his Grammar. 
Fletcher's communicative theory of action represents an 
improvement over alternative theories. It compares favorably with the 
causal and teleological concepts of action that were elaborated in civil- 
law jurisdictions during the last fifty years because it is premised on the 
fact that a concept of action can only be normatively appealing once it is 
divorced from metaphysical and ontological abstractions. The 
communicative concept of action should also be preferred over Moore's 
mechanistic concept of action and Husak's control principle. Moore's 
theory of actions as "willed bodily movements" places too much weight 
on the movement/non-movement distinction, while Husak's reliance on 
control unjustifiably broadens the number of cases that could trigger the 
imposition of criminal liability. Ultimately, moral judgments on 
criminal responsibility should be based on whether or not the 
defendant's conduct could be intersubjectively construed as an instance 
of meaningful behavior and not on whether or not he willed his muscles 
into movement or had control over the state of affairs that ensued. This 
is more compatible with Fletcher's concept of action than with Moore's 
or Husak's. 
Heinonline - -  28 Cardozo L .  Rev. 2480 2006-2007 
